PRESENTATION OF THE CONDITION BEFORE THE CRIME
The municipality of Vareš is located in central Bosnia. According to the 1991 census, the municipality had a total of 22,203 inhabitants, of which 40.6% were Croats, 30.2% Muslims/Bosniacs, 16.4% Serbs, 9.3% Yugoslavs and the remaining 3.5% Others . While the majority of the population in the municipality was Croats, the majority of the population in Stupni Do was Bosniaks.
The association that "Bosnia in miniature" was associated with Vareš, and the results of the multi-party elections in 1990 were also interesting, when out of 50 seats in the Municipal Assembly, SK BiH-SDP won 19 seats. They were followed by HDZ 13, SDA 9, reformists 8 and DSS 1 mandate. The election results showed that Bosniaks and Croats from Vara were not so interested in national parties. The Party of Democratic Action barely met the conditions to participate in the elections, and the SDS was not even formed. HDZ supported and helped SDA to participate in the elections and persuaded the Serbian population of Vara to form SDS. He needed this because of his own strengthening through the homogenization of the Croatian nation. But the majority of the population, regardless of nationality, was gathered around non-national parties. For this reason, the HDZ needed to weaken those parties, primarily the SDP, and this could only be done by forming the national parties of the other two nations, which would force the Croats of Vara to side with the HDZ, especially in conditions when they accept those parties as hostile to them. and make sure that the other two nations are also with their national parties. The strengthening of the SDA and SDS, or the weakening of the SDP and the SRS, that is, the reformists, also strengthened the HDZ.
After the elections in 1990, Dario Andrijević, a Croat from SK BiH-SDP, was elected president of Vareš municipality, while Zvonimir Dugonjić from HDZ was the president of the Executive Board.
In Vareš, until July 1, 1992, there was a joint Territorial Defense of the municipality of Vareš, which included both Croats and Bosniaks. When on July 1, with the instructions of the leader of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna (HHZB), the HVO took over power in the municipality, the HVO forces under the command of Borivoj Malbašić, on the instructions of the vice-president of the HVO HZHB Darij Kordić, removed Bosniaks from the positions of the municipal authorities. Part of the Bosniaks (who were in favor of the division of power in the municipality) remained. Mate Boban appointed Anta Pejčinović as the president of the municipal HVO, one of the initiators of the establishment of the HDZ in Vareš, and Zvonimir Dugonjić as the vice-president. The Bosniaks withdrew from the joint headquarters of the TO of Vareš municipality and the SDA formed a government in exile by establishing the War Presidency in Striježevo, later in the village of Dabravine. The Croatian Defense Council banned the members of the ARBiH from entering the city to visit their families. Very often they are harassed and arrested. Unlike them, the members of the VRS were allowed to enter, and the wounded members of the VRS were even treated in the Vara hospital.
On November 18, 1991, HZHB was formed in Grude, a political project of Franja Tuđman, whose purpose was the institutional destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of dividing and later separating and joining a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Croatia. The community consisted of 30 municipalities, and Vareš was on that list. However, none of the representatives from Vares were present at the founding assembly of HZ Herceg-Bosna. And later several times during important meetings, it happened that the representatives of HDZ Vareš were not present, that is, they were not even invited by the organizers, despite the fact that on several occasions the representatives of the Vareš authorities emphasized that they wanted to be part of the Croatian provinces (e.g. the meeting of the representatives of Kakanj and Vareš with Kordić, April 8, 1993, etc.) One of the acceptable reasons why Vareš representatives were excluded could be that Vareš and Kakanj for Tuđman had a purpose other than the territorial one. Tuđman had no territorial pretensions in the valley of the river Bosna and especially east of the river Bosna. He knew that he could not separate Vareš physically, because it is too far from the strength of Herceg-Bosnia, and it would also cut off the "Muslim enclave", and he was looking for a way that would be acceptable to the other two sides. This territory was supposed to serve as a settlement, that is, compensation for another more important territory. What was called the so-called "humane resettlement of the population", during the war it was achieved through military means and military actions, coercion and, unfortunately, crimes. It was necessary to encourage the exodus of residents from central Bosnia in order to make the territory of HZHB more ethnically homogeneous.
When Borivoj Malbašić, commander of HVO Vareš, asked Slobodan Praljko what would happen to Vareš, he answered:
"There is no such policy that will and can lead to us having everything. If it can, give it.”
From that answer, it is evident that HZHB gave up on Vareš. There was a similar answer for Posavina. Another statement by Praljko explains this important segment of Croatian politics:
"We need borders and space where we are. The people on stage are playing a role for political gain... If the people don't want to move out and move to their own space, we won't get anything... We have five years to do it. If we know and succeed, we have won."
(On May 10, Ante Valenta wrote to Jean-Pierre Thibaut from PMEZ that it would take five years to carry out the population resettlement in stages, which shows that there was a plan drawn up for that work with a clear deadline for implementation.)
The leaders of the HZHB in the first phase tried to separate the Croats of Varaje from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the institutions of legal authority and especially from the ARBiH. They tried to separate the Croat population from the Bosniaks, in order to encourage them to move away from there. On the other hand, armed attacks in Kiseljak, Busovača and Vitez prepared housing for the Croats from Vara. HVO propaganda scared its own people in order to encourage them to emigrate with frequent statements that there was no "coexistence with Muslims".
The Croats of Vara were aware of their insufficient military strength, but also of their distance from the strength of Herceg-Bosnia. They were wedged between two areas, the valley of Bosnia and the Tuzla region, trying to survive where they live and not cause a conflict, considering that the armed conflict between the ARBiH and the HVO had already started in the surrounding regions. Surrounded in the north and south by the forces of the ARBiH and in the east by the VRS, they tried and tried to survive in that area and tried to survive in their homeland. The civil and military authorities in Vares in their cooperation oriented more towards Tuzla, especially when relations in the Zenica region became complicated and conflicts between the ARBiH and the HVO had already begun, while the Tuzla region was not burdened by the relationship between the ARBiH and the HVO. The Vareš civil authorities also cooperated with the Serbs in Sokolac, and the HVO with the VRS. In addition, they had tolerant relations with Zenica. That they had the protection of Tuzla and the 2nd Corps of the ARBiH is shown by the fact that Commander Hazim Šadić intervened with General Rasim Delic so that the 3rd Corps of the ARBiH did not act towards the municipality of Varaš, when there was a conflict with the HVO in the neighboring municipality of Kakanj.
Since May 1993, in Vares, the pressure of the HVO towards the members of the ARBiH has eased and negotiations have been conducted regarding the normalization of relations. Until the second half of October 1993, it can be said that some status quo was maintained.
After the capture of Kakanj by the ARBiH on June 13, 1993, the Croatian population there moved to the area of Vareš, estimated at 7,000 to 10,000, including about 3,500 men of military age. With the arrival of this population in Vareš, the situation improved a lot. Many members of the HVO from Kakanj were eager for revenge and behaved extremely towards the Bosniak population. The Varese authorities, led by Pejčinović, Zvonko Dužnević, and Ivica Gavran, made an effort to prevent the conflict from spreading to the municipality of Varese, pacifying the Kakan extremists.
Another important event was the one related to the interruption of the Zenica-Tuzla road. Namely, one traveled to Tuzla towards Zenica via the municipalities of Žepača and Vareška. Due to the conflict between the ARBiH and the HVO in Žepč, in July 1993, the HVO from Žepč together with the VRS closed the road from the direction of Tuzla to Zenica, which put the 2nd Corps of the ARBiH in serious logistical problems. The only safe communication was through Vares. The ARBiH command was afraid that the Vara leadership would do the same as the HVO in Žepč, that is, they would form a coalition with the VRS, which would block the only road from Tuzla to Zenica, which would bring Tuzla into the environment. The command of the ARBiH closely followed the situation in Vares, but did not want to intervene militarily. The Croats from Varese were not in the mood for a conflict with the ARBiH, knowing their position, nor did they want to act like the HVO in Žepč, probably knowing that they would not survive on the road Zenica - Tuzla, between the two strongest corps of the ARBiH, the Second and Third. The civil and military authorities of Varadero dragged out the situation, trying to avoid an armed conflict in which they would not have the slightest chance.
The leaders of Herceg-Bosna tried more and more intensively to realize the intention of relocating the Croats from Vara to the territory under the control of the HVO. Considering that they were not interested, the HB leadership should have provoked an armed conflict in the municipality of Varese, which would have forced the ARBiH from the direction of Zenica and Tuzla to intervene militarily, which would have frightened the civilian population of Varese and agreed to emigrate, in fact it should have created fear. For this purpose, in October 1993, the most extreme members of the HVO units from Kiseljak were transferred to Vareš through Serbian territory.
Arriving extremists first physically abused representatives of the Croatian government and arrested their leadership (Pejčinović, Dužnović, Gavran) who, according to the HVO, "weakened the military potential of the HVO in Vareš by demobilizing soldiers" and dismissed them from their duties. They did this because they tried to prevent terror and crimes against the Bosniak population.
Then, at the checkpoint on October 18 in Pajtovo Han, the HVO detained and mistreated six members of the ARBiH, seeking information about armed Bosniaks in Stupno Dol. They were beaten by members of the Military Police platoon attached to the "Bobovac" brigade and members of the "Maturice" detachment.
These events produced a retaliation by the ARBiH, which carried out a successful attack on the village of Kopijari on October 21. After that, Milivoj Petković and Ivica Rajić as well as Tihomir Blaškić sent reinforcements to their units in manpower and weapons. On October 22, Rajić arrived in Vareš through the territory of the VRS with 210 people, of which 100 to 150 were soldiers of the special units "Maturice" and "Apostoli" and soldiers of the "Ban Josip Jelačić" brigade from Kiseljak, as well as eight policemen from the platoon of this brigade from Kiseljak. Petković later said that this was done as stated "due to total disorganization in the defense of Vareš".
On October 23, Slobodan Praljak issued an order to Petković, Rajić, Kordić, Blaškić and Marij Bradara to "sort out the situation in Vareš without mercy to anyone" with people "who are up to the task and the time". This order greatly contributed to criminal activities and crimes. From October 23, intensive arrests, harassment and looting of Bosniaks and the town of Vareš began, arresting between 250 and 450 men aged 15 to 75. Women were also detained and sexually abused.
CRIME IN STUPID DOL
In Stupni Dol, the HVO government issued an ultimatum to the residents of the village in June 1993, asking them to surrender their weapons, otherwise they would be attacked. Fearing an attack, the residents refused, and after the ultimatum expired, most of the residents fled to neighboring villages. When the HVO did not attack the village after a few days, the villagers returned home. After that, the village was guarded by a village guard of slightly more than 40 guards. With modest weapons, the guards did not even undergo military training, except for those who served in the JNA. Some did not even have a uniform. That area was under the command of the 322nd ARBiH Brigade from Dabravina. On October 18, members of the HVO arrested the commander of the village guard, Himza Likić. At the time of the HVO attack on the village on October 23, the village was defended by about 40 members. At that time, there were 220 inhabitants and 8 displaced persons in the village.
On October 23, at 8 a.m., while the village guard was changing shifts, the HVO forces attacked the village with shelling, followed by continuous fire from infantry and anti-aircraft weapons and incendiary ammunition, and around 10 a.m. the HVO took control. They then entered the village in groups of 25 to 30 members each, wearing black uniforms with white stripes on the left upper arm and green camouflage uniforms. Some had their faces masked and wore HVO insignia, while others had no insignia. Those who wore black uniforms also had black baseball caps and were members of the HVO's special squads ("death squads"). Some members carried buckets of gasoline with them. They looted homes, killed and burned the inhabitants, destroying the entire village. Part of the population hid in the basement of the community center. The defense of Stupni do gathered in the main part of the village and guarded 50 to 60 civilians in the main village shelter. Part of the population also hid in the nearby forest. After the intensity of the fire decreased around 16:30 and the HVO forces withdrew, the residents returned to the village to look for survivors.
52 houses were burned and everything in the houses resembled crematoria. 38 people were killed, including 20 women. Among the killed was a child up to two years old. Five children were killed. Of the total number of those killed, 32 were civilians and six were soldiers. 34 members of the Likić family, two from the Mahmutović family, and one member each from the Rahić and Žutić families were killed. The victims were brutally tortured, burned, and some had their limbs cut off. Livestock were found burned and killed. Murders were also committed in the town of Vares, killing six more Bosniaks.
After the crime, the HVO prevented members of NORDBAT from entering the village by creating obstacles, placing mines and opening fire on vehicles. Members of the VP platoon blocked access to the village. On October 25, one of the UN military observers was allowed to enter the village with Ivica Rajić, after previous negotiations, and on October 26, a NORDBAT patrol entered the village, accompanied by members of the HVO, PMEZ, TV Kiseljak crew and members of BRITBAT.
After this cruel crime, HB leaders used manipulations and denial of the crime. For example, at the meeting with Tuđman on December 15, 1993, Boban claimed that only two or three civilians were killed in Stupni Do on October 23 and that the other victims were ARBiH fighters and that Stupni Do is "the strongest Muslim stronghold near Vareš ". After this crime, criminals were rewarded, such as Ivica Rajić, against whom no punishment was filed by the Croatian leadership and the head of HB, but his identity was changed and he continued to perform his previous duties under the new name - Viktor Andrić.
The crimes in Stupno dol and the city were committed by the units "Maturica" and "Apostoli", among them the commander of "Maturica", Dominik Ilijašević Como and "Apostola" - Marinko Jurišić Spiro. The HVO commander who commanded the Stupni Do operation on the ground was Marinko Ljoljo. Soldiers Miroslav Anić Firga, Ermin Čurtić, as well as soldiers whose names/nicknames were Dragan, Kum, Ljubo, Filip, Kakanjac and others took part in the operation. Although the "Bobovac" brigade did not directly participate in the attack on Stupni Do, it had the task of providing logistical support to the special units of the HVO and, after their departure, had to take control of that area. Ivica Rajić was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the crimes in Stupno Dol. Dominik Ilijašević Como and Miroslav Anić Firga were sentenced to 15 years each, and Ermin Čurtić to five and a half years in prison. The leaders of the HZHB, led by Jadranka Prlić, were also sentenced to several years in prison for these crimes, among others.
Emigration of the CROATIAN POPULATION
After these events, thousands of Bosnian Croats left Vareš. From November 2, 1993, intense population movements followed in the direction of Daštanski, Brgul and Kiseljak. The HVO requested the mediation of UNPROFOR in the evacuation of the civilian population. In some cases, members of the HVO forced the Croatian population to leave, even with threats of weapons. On November 4, 1993, the RBiH army surrounded the town of Vareš, and on November 5, they put it under their control.
Unlike the crimes committed by members of the HVO in Ahmići and Han Ploča, with the aim of intimidating Bosniaks and driving them out of the municipalities of Viteška and Kiseljak, the crime against Bosniaks in Stupno Dol was committed so that the Croats of Varaš would fear Bosniak reprisals and fear for their own moved out of the Vareš municipality to Kiseljak.
The Second Corps of the ARBiH had the task of defeating the forces of the HVO in Daštansko, but it did not do so. He estimated that the HVO in Daštanski could not threaten the use of the road from Zenica, through Kakanj and Vareš to Tuzla. This shows that the only goal of the ARBiH was to prevent the collaboration of the Varese HVO with the VRS, which would cut off Tuzla from Zenica, and not to persecute the Varese Croats. But we should also mention one murder that happened in the area of the municipality, when a drunk member of the ARBiH killed a deaf old man, Jerko Terzić. He was immediately arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to 8 years before the Zenica District Military Court, before judge Mladen Veseljak. The highest state authorities of the RBiH in connection with the action of the ARBiH for the liberation of Vareš ordered and appealed that no harm should happen to civilians of Croatian nationality. If there was any coercion of the Croats to emigrate, from certain local Bosniak politicians and units or individuals from the ARBiH, and it cannot be said that there was not, then it was only in favor of the politics of Herceg-Bosnia.
That the main goal of the HVO attack was the emigration of Croats, and not the occupation of territory, is also shown by the fact that Kordić and Blaškić spent incomparably more energy to prevent the Croats of Zenica, Travnik, Kakanj and Vareš from returning to their homes than they did to send help to their fighters to defend against ARBiH counterattacks. After committing crimes against Bosniaks from Vara in Stupni Dol and other villages as well as in the city, the criminals returned to Kiseljak via Serbian territory, thus leaving the Croats from Vara at the mercy of the ARBiH units, which moved from Tuzla and Zenica to Vara. The criminals from Kiseljak achieved their goal. The Croats from Vara were frightened, panicked and started leaving the territory of that municipality en masse. Amija RBiH did not shine, but that did not help because by the time the territory was liberated, the majority of the Croatian population had almost moved out. One enclave remained under the control of the HVO in the Vareš municipality - in the village of Daštansko.
Sources: Process and Case no. IT-04-74, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al;
Subject no. IT-95-12, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajić;
Amir Kliko, "War in Central Bosnia 1992-1994."
ICTY documents, electronic and printed databases;
Archives of the UNSA Institute for Research on Crimes against Humanity and International Law;
(Dr.Sc. Zilha Mastalić Košuta is a senior research associate, UNSA Institute for Research on Crimes against Humanity and International Law)