On May 25, 1995, a grenade fired from the direction of Ozren killed 71 civilians and wounded 173 others, making this one of the most massive shelling crimes during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the occasion of the 31st anniversary of this crime, we remember, we commemorate, and we do not forget.
Below is an excerpt from a paper by Dr. Merisa Karović-Babić (Merisa Karović-Babić), Senior Research Associate at the University of Sarajevo – Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law:
“Five hours before the massacre at Tuzla’s Kapija, in which 71 civilians were killed and 173 wounded, symbolic NATO strikes were carried out on ammunition depots of the VRS near Pale. The air strikes on the VRS occurred due to violations of the exclusion zone for heavy weapons around Sarajevo, thereby threatening not only the credibility of UNPROFOR but also NATO.
Following fears that NATO attacks could continue in the coming period, the Chief of the Main Staff of the VRS and closest associate of war criminal Ratko Mladić (Ratko Mladić), General Manojlo Milovanović (Manojlo Milovanović), reported that ‘the enemy’s actions were promptly responded to by engaging observed targets,’ mentioning artillery fire on the Hum repeater, UN checkpoints (except the Russian one), as well as on the enclaves of Srebrenica, Goražde, and Tuzla Airport, along with indications that further offensive operations were being planned.
The execution of these orders by the Main Staff of the VRS to corps commanders implied a demonstration of force against all cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were supposed to be under United Nations “protection,” whereby the symbolism of Youth Day would remain permanently engraved in the memory of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a synonym for the killing of youth.”
The announcement of a general danger alarm in the Tuzla district and the shelling of Dubrava Airport with 13 grenades (19:30–20:46), where a UNPROFOR air base was located and where three grenades hit the helicopter landing area (approximately 13 km from the center of Tuzla), was, for the young people of Tuzla gathered at Kapija, merely a routine occurrence—something they had become accustomed to. Meanwhile, at 20:20, a grenade fired from Ozren also struck the area of the railway station.
Members of the Public Security Station (SJB) attempted to warn those gathered and remind them that a general danger alarm had been issued, but these warnings simply did not reach the citizens, who were eager for a brief sense of relaxation due to the symbolism of the date, as well as the fact that, after several rainy days, May 25 was sunny and clear, making the spring evening ideal for going out, walking, and socializing.
According to eyewitness estimates, there were several hundred young people at Kapija, as a handball match had ended around 8:00 p.m., resulting in an even larger crowd than usual. At 20:55, a grenade fired from VRS positions on Ozren exploded among the crowd gathered at the site, which was also the main meeting point in Tuzla.
Following forensic and criminal investigation and identification, which—according to the order of the investigating judge of the Higher Court in Tuzla—began half an hour before midnight and was completed during May 26, it was determined that 66 civilians were killed immediately, while in the following days five more people died from their injuries, bringing the total number of fatalities to 71.
The work was entrusted to medical specialists under the leadership of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zdenko Cihlarž, specialist in forensic medicine and pathological anatomy, head of the Institute and the Department of Forensic Medicine at the Faculty of Medicine in Tuzla.
A detailed description of the methodology concerning the fatal injuries of each individual is included in the official Record of External Examination and Identification of the Victims of the Tuzla Massacre, along with published distressing photographs. The documentation also includes video materials, i.e., recordings of the victims made at the Institute of Forensic Medicine and the Institute of Pathology of the Clinical Center of the Faculty of Medicine in Tuzla.
The majority of the victims were second- and third-year university students. The youngest victim killed at Kapija was a two-and-a-half-year-old boy, Sandro Kalesić, while the oldest was 53-year-old Ilinka Tadić, a nurse from the Medical Center in Slavinovići.
According to the report of the investigating judge who was responsible for conducting the on-site investigation after the massacre, “at that moment, at the clinical medical center, no one knew exactly how many wounded persons were in need of medical assistance. The admission of the wounded into the hospital was not carried out in the usual way through the admission department, where each person admitted is registered in official records, because their number was extremely high, and registration at that moment would have meant a loss of precious time.” Therefore, different sources cite different figures, while according to final records, 173 civilians were wounded in the Kapija massacre (106 seriously and 67 lightly injured).
Immediately after the massacre, a struggle to save the survivors followed. Throughout the next two days, doctors and all medical staff of the Clinical Center made superhuman efforts to save the wounded, and surgical interventions were performed in all 16 operating rooms.
Public announcements and calls requesting all available medical personnel to report to the Clinical Medical Center were issued 35 minutes after the massacre, along with an appeal for voluntary blood donors, which was answered by a large number of citizens of Tuzla.
The Norwegian and Pakistani battalions also provided assistance with medical supplies, while on May 26 an extraordinary session of the Government of the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton (TPC) adopted several decisions, four of which concerned the allocation of financial resources to the Clinical Medical Center, including medical supplies, as well as a decision on providing assistance to the affected citizens and the families of those killed in the massacre.
The TPC Government also decided to suspend classes in primary, secondary, and higher education institutions until further notice, as the shelling of Tuzla continued in the following days, during which one person was killed, while several others were seriously and lightly injured, and significant material damage was also inflicted on private and business properties.
Due to the continued shelling, a dignified burial of the victims was called into question. It was therefore decided that the funeral and burial would take place on May 29 at 4:00 a.m. at the Slana Banja promenade, while a number of victims were, according to the wishes of their families, buried in local cemeteries and graveyards.
The Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Government (TPC) declared a three-day mourning period for May 27, 28, and 29, while May 25 has, every year in Tuzla, become an “unofficial day of mourning,” since “the official one was never declared.” Each year on May 25, the citizens of Tuzla “avoid lighter topics and social media posts, cafés turn off music, radio and television stations refrain from playing cheerful music, and citizens silently lay flowers at Kapija in large numbers. Almost all institutions, associations, organizations, political parties, and others present in Tuzla lay wreaths and light candles at Kapija on May 25.”
In addition to the commemoration organized by the City of Tuzla, many local institutions also organize their own forms of remembrance. The Public Institution Archives of Tuzla Canton, in cooperation with the Association of Archival Employees of Tuzla Canton and the Commission for Civilian War Victims 1992–1995 of the Municipality of Tuzla, on the 16th anniversary of the massacre in May 2011 published an exhibition of documents and photographs titled “Tuzla ‘Kapija 25.05.1995’ – Facts,” which included documents and highly disturbing photographs of the victims, as well as information on the verdict in the case of Novak Đukić.
Already on the first anniversary of the massacre, a necrology was published containing detailed information on the victims killed at Kapija, whose interrupted youth continues to live on through permanent exhibition displays, with a message to future generations that “people die here so that life may continue.”
An eyewitness to the massacre, Major Guy Sands, head of the G-5 department of the UNPROFOR Northeast Sector in Tuzla, described the harrowing scenes, noting that it was “and remains in the most literal sense what the local population calls the Massacre of the Innocents.” Calls for NATO military intervention as a means of punishing the VRS followed immediately after the massacre.
However, the disturbing footage recorded immediately after the crime would soon, in the Western European media space, be replaced by images of helpless UNPROFOR members tied to bridges, poles, and other potential NATO targets. The fear for 400 UNPROFOR members held hostage completely overshadowed the punishment of those responsible for the Kapija massacre.
It became clear that the hostage crisis postponed this type of action indefinitely, until the moment when the regrouping of UNPROFOR troops would be completed, which effectively implied their withdrawal from the eastern enclaves, including Srebrenica and Žepa.
Immediately after the massacre, an on-site investigation was conducted under the supervision of the investigating judge of the Higher Court in Tuzla. The investigative team consisted of representatives of the Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Interior (MUP) from Tuzla. On the following day, May 26, they were joined by the head of the criminalistics department and three inspectors from the counter-terrorism protection unit from Sarajevo, as well as UN military observers from the United Kingdom, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, and an artillery specialist.
It can be concluded that the investigation was carried out in a highly professional manner, especially considering the wartime conditions and the sudden shelling. Members of the investigative team approached the investigative actions with utmost thoroughness, and these procedures did not differ from those conducted in peacetime conditions. Such detailed investigative work and the evidentiary materials collected at the scene immediately after the massacre had immeasurable value in the later establishment of responsibility for the crime.
Despite the fact that all the mentioned investigations established that the grenades were fired from territory under the control of the Ozren Tactical Group, as well as Milovanović’s admissions that he had received reports from that group about projectiles fired at the city of Tuzla, denial of responsibility for the crime has been widespread. It persisted throughout the entire court proceedings and continued even after the final verdict of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Novak Đukić case.
Several books have been published in Belgrade aimed at revising historical facts and denying final court verdicts, thereby directly violating the dignity of the victims of the Tuzla Kapija massacre. This situation is further compounded by the fact that the only person convicted for this crime has not served his prison sentence, despite General Đukić’s guilt, as commander of the Ozren Tactical Group, having been proven beyond any reasonable doubt.
However, a misinterpretation and inappropriate application of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Maktouf–Damjanović case by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to an absurd and paradoxical situation in which, in addition to Novak Đukić, other individuals convicted of the most serious crimes (10 persons), including genocide and war crimes, were released following decisions on the “suspension of sentence execution.”
In February 2014, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a decision suspending Đukić’s prison sentence and ordering his “immediate release,” while two months later, the Appellate Division Panel I for War Crimes of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a second-instance verdict finding Đukić guilty and sentencing him to 20 years in prison.
The arguments regarding Đukić’s responsibility as commander of the Ozren Tactical Group were not questioned in any respect in the 2014 second-instance judgment. However, the fact that Đukić was released contributed to the encouragement of crime deniers and revisionists, and institutions of the Republic of Serbia, including the War Crimes Department of the Higher Court in Belgrade, have participated in such denial and revisionism.
A more detailed version of the paper is available at this link.
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